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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. I show that abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before
colonial rule. I test a model in which exogenous land quality and endogenous population
determine the existence of land rights and slavery. I use cross-sectional data on a global
sample of societies to demonstrate that, as in the model, land rights occurred where land
quality was high and where population density was greatest. Slavery existed where land
was good and population density was intermediate. The model can explain institutional
differences across regions, but not within regions. I present suggestive evidence that this
is due to institutional spillovers.
1. INTRODUCTION
The “land abundance” view of African history is an influential explanation of the eco-
nomic institutions that existed on the continent before colonial rule (Austin, 2008a;
Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). This theory holds that, since uncleared land was freely avail-
able, land had no price, and rights to land were ill-defined. Because cultivators would
not become free workers, coerced and household labor substituted for wage employ-
ment. Lagerlo¨f’s (2010) model of “slavery and other property rights” mirrors these argu-
ments in a formal model. In this paper, I use cross-sectional data on a sample of global
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societies to test this view. I show that land rights and slavery existed in those regions pre-
dicted by the model, but that institutional spillovers prevent the model from predicting
differences within broad geographic regions.1
The pre-colonial institutions explained by the “land abundance” view constrained the
actions of colonial powers (e.g. Austin (2008b)). As a result, pre-colonial institutions and
the forces that shaped them affect current performance in Africa (e.g. Gennaioli and
Rainer (2007) or Tertilt (2005)). It is well established in economics that institutions mat-
ter (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dell, 2011). Land rights and slavery, in particular, continue to
affect outcomes in Africa and in the rest of the world. Land tenure shapes investment
incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), labor-supply (Field, 2007), and violence (Andre
and Platteau, 1998). Nunn (2008a) shows that those African countries that exported the
most slaves are comparatively poor today. The pre-colonial prevalence of indigenous
slavery is negatively correlated with current income within Africa (Bezemer et al., 2009).
Within the Americas, legacies of slavery explain differences in income across countries
and U.S. counties (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn, 2008b), as well as long term
racial gaps in education and other measures (Miller, 2008; Sacerdote, 2005). Explain-
ing pre-colonial land tenure and slavery is, then, important in understanding African
poverty.
The “land abundance” view of African history argues that the continent’s geography
has given it an abundance of land relative to labor, which explains the general features
of its development. In other contexts, geographic features, such as continental orienta-
tion, ruggedness, settler mortality, suitability for specific crops, and other biogeographic
endowments predict contemporary institutional differences across countries (Easterly
and Levine, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn and Puga, 2011). The model I
test, from Lagerlo¨f (2010), similarly allows geography to shape institutions. There are
two important variables determining land rights and slavery. The first is exogenous land
quality. This increases the returns to landownership, compensates for the inefficiencies
of slavery, and sustains greater populations in the Malthusian steady state. The second
1In earlier versions of this paper, I extended the model to include raiding of neighboring societies for
slaves and an explanation for polygyny. These extensions have been removed. Earlier, I used only African
data. Now I use data from the entire world, and so the results differ substantially from those presented in
earlier versions.
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is population, which responds to both the geographic and institutional environments.
It shapes the relative values of land and labor and the relative costs of free and forced
workers.
I test this thesis. I use data on a cross-section of global societies from Murdock’s (1967)
Ethnographic Atlas to support a model of land rights and slavery in which the land-
labor ratio determines the institutions that exist. I find that the model correctly predicts
that land rights and slavery were found in those societies that occupied the best land,
and that greater population densities were correlated with rights over land. Slavery was
present when population densities were intermediate, as in the model. While the model
predicts differences across regions, there are forms of slavery that it cannot predict, and
it is not capable of predicting differences within regions.
In Section 2, I outline the literature in African history on how land abundance has
shaped economic institutions. Here, I present the basic features of the model and its
testable implications. In Section 3, I describe the data used and lay out the economet-
ric specifications. In Section 4, I report the results of these tests. In Section 5, I show
that these results are robust to different measures of the institutional outcomes, alter-
native proxies for land quality and historical population density, and the possible en-
dogeneity of land quality. I also argue that this theory of land rights and slavery better
explains the data than some prominent alternatives, including ecological risk as a cause
of common property, and suitability for specific crops as a predictor of slavery. While
the model is generally robust to removing influential observations, there are exceptions
that point towards the mechanisms by which institutional transitions occur. In Section
6, I demonstrate that the model is unable to predict differences within regions, and that
there is substantial spatial correlation in institutional outcomes. This is consistent with
what anthropologists call “Galton’s problem” – the lack of independence in cultural ob-
servations. In Section 7 I conclude.
2. THE LAND ABUNDANCE VIEW OF AFRICAN HISTORY
2.1. The literature. A first-order task in African history is explaining the continent’s
long-run differences in economic organization from the rest of the world. The start-
ing point of the land abundance view is the difference in settlement patterns between
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Africa and the rest of the world on the eve of colonial rule. Herbst (2000, p. 16) es-
timates the population density of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1900 at 4.4 persons per Sq.
Km, contrasted with 38.2 for South Asia, 45.6 for China, and 62.9 for Europe.2 Expla-
nations of low African population densities stress geographic factors, the disease en-
vironment, and historical factors such as the slave trades (Mahadi and Inikori, 1987,
p. 63-64). This sparse settlement, Hopkins (1973, p. 23-27) argues, shaped institutions,
because Africans “measured wealth and power in men rather than in acres.”3 Here, I
focus on the implications for land rights and slavery.
Before the Atlantic slave trade, African settlement was characterized by small clear-
ings surrounded by vast wastelands in the Equatorial region, circles of increasingly wild
vegetation in the West African forest, and clusters with oscillating frontiers in the West
African Savanna (Iliffe, 1995, p. 36,64-67). Austin (2009, p. 33) argues that, as a con-
sequence, land was “easily and cheaply accessible in institutional terms”; pre-colonial
authorities were eager to attract “more people with whom to subdue nature and, if nec-
essary, their neighbors,” so that strangers could generally acquire land indefinitely for
token payments. These payments were made solely to acknowledge the sovereignty of
the local authorities. Citizens were given land virtually freely. Austin (2008a, p. 591-594)
notes that ‘islands’ of intensive agriculture have existed in Africa where insecurity has
created artificial land scarcity and in specific locations of exceptional value. These had
minerals, trees, market access, or suitability for particular crops.
Against these views, Spear (1997, p. 154-157) argues that population density cannot
explain individual cases. While on Mount Meru both the Arusha and the Meru inten-
sified their agriculture as population rose, the less densely settled Meru did so more
readily. Berry (1988), similarly, has noted that inheritance rules, tenancy contracts, and
labor arrangements often prevent tree crops from leading to individualized land tenure
in West Africa. Thornton (1992, p. 75-76) suggests that ownership of land results from
legal claims, not population pressure.
2His estimate for North Africa is 9.4 persons per Sq. Km.
3Austin (2008a, p. 589) argues that Hopkins was the first to make this analysis systematic; earlier writers
on Africa did account for the existence of slavery, for example, by noting Africa’s land abundance – see
Dowd (1917).
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For Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), scarcity of labor explains African use of forced labor.
He builds on the arguments of Nieboer (1900) and Domar (1970), who argue that co-
ercion is cheaper than paying a wage when labor is scarce and wages high. With some
notable exceptions (Rodney, 1966), slavery was prevalent in much of Africa even prior
to the Atlantic slave trade (Fage, 1969). Watson (1980, p. 10) suggests that the ability of
slaves and their descendants to assimilate into their owners’ lineages was a “logical ex-
tension of the institutionalized need for more people.” Land abundance has been used
to explain differences across societies. Northrup (1979) contrasts the densely-settled
Igbo of the palm belt with the relatively sparsely populated northeastern Igbo during
the palm oil trade. Slavery did not expand in the palm belt, while the northeastern Igbo
used slaves to colonize new land.
The use of underpopulation to explain African slavery is controversial. Writers such
as Kopytoff and Miers (1977, p. 68-69), Lovejoy (1978, p. 349), or Miers and Klein (1998,
p. 4-5) have stressed that they were employed in non-economic uses, distributed by
non-market means, and that colonial rulers turned a blind eye to slavery for political
reasons. Kopytoff (1987, p. 46) and Goody (1980, p. 26-31) suggest that dependents must
be “seduced” rather than coerced, so slavery can only exist in complex societies and
states with “well-developed systems of compulsion.”
I clarify this literature and test its claims. With the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model as a rea-
sonable formalization of the “land abundance” view, it becomes clear that some of the
critiques of the land abundance view are not in fact inconsistent with it. While high
wages resulting from population density explain the preference for slavery over free la-
bor under certain conditions in the model, there are also under conditions in which
population is too sparse for slavery to be worthwhile, corresponding with the less com-
plex societies in Africa that have poorly developed systems of compulsion. More im-
portantly, I test the land abundance view in a global sample of societies, defending it
against many of these critiques. I show that the institutional effects of population and
agricultural productivity follow regular patterns even if they cannot explain every case.
I show that the presence of slavery is systematically related to the economic value of
slaves and to population.
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2.2. Model. In this paper, I test the model of “slavery and other property rights” from
Lagerlo¨f (2009). This is for two reasons. First, his model echoes the arguments made
by historians of Africa, making explicit the testable implications of their views. Greater
population lowers average product, which is shared equally in an egalitarian regime.
This creates incentives to create rights over land. Similarly, the relative costs of land
rights and slavery are determined by the competitive wage, which is itself a function of
population size. If population pressure increases labor supply and depresses the wage,
free labor becomes profitable relative to keeping slaves.
Second, his model extends the “land abundance” literature. If population is suffi-
ciently low, slavery will not exist, since population pressure has not adequately de-
pressed the returns to an egalitarian sharing of output while the opportunity costs of
wasting labor on coercion remain high. This reconciles the land abundance view with
the critiques of Kopytoff and Goody. In addition, the quality of land determines both
the relative profitability of institutional regimes for a given population and the level of
population that can be supported. This variable has been generally neglected by the
Africanist literature. Lagerlo¨f (2009) makes the concept of “land abundance” more pre-
cise; it is the availability of cultivable land relative to both population and productivity
that matters. Here, I briefly sketch the basic elements of the model and state its testable
implications.
The model takes a society in period t with a population Pt of non-elite agents and a
comparatively small elite that does not work. The elite chooses institutions. Output Yt
depends on land M , land-augmenting productivity A˜t, and the labor used Lt:
Yt = (MA˜t)
αL1−αt ≡ Aαt L1−αt .(1)
At the beginning of each period, the elite chooses between three regimes based on
which one yields them the greatest profits piit, where i denotes one of three institutional
regimes. The first is egalitarianism. Under this arrangement, there are no land rights or
slavery. The elite and the non-elite each receive average product, and so:
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piEt =
(At
Pt
)α
.(2)
The second possible outcome is slavery. Here, the elite enclose the entire land, creat-
ing rights over it. They enslave St slaves from the population, paying them only subsis-
tence income c¯. Each slave requires γ guards, who are also paid c¯, and so the elite payoff
is:
piSt = max
St≤Pt/(1+γ)
{Aαt S1−αt − (1 + γ)c¯St}.(3)
The third possible outcome is free labor. Again, the elite enclose the entire land. Now,
however, they hire members of the population at a competitive wagewt, which depends
on Pt. The elite’s payoff is:
piFt = max
Lt≥0
{Aαt L1−αt − wtLt}.(4)
Lagerlo¨f (2009) shows that the state space in At and Pt can be divided into three sets:
SE, in which the elite prefer egalitarianism; SS, in which they prefer slavery, and; SS,
in which they prefer free labor. The boundaries of these regions are defined by three
functions of Pt: Ψ(Pt), Ω(Pt), and Φ(Pt).
4 These are depicted in Figure 1.
The slavery region, SS, is where At ≥ max{Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)}, and Pt > (1 + γ)1−α. At ≥
Ψ(Pt) implies that population givenAt is still sufficiently low thatwt is high relative to the
cost of keeping slaves. At ≥ Ω(Pt) implies that population is sufficiently dense that the
average product under egalitarianism has fallen, while high productivity also ensures
the elite is willing to waste some labor on guarding slaves in order to take a greater share
4
Ψ(Pt) =
( c¯(1 + γ)1−α
1− α(1 + γ)1−α
) 1
α
Pt
Ω(Pt) =
( c¯(1 + γ)1−αP 1+αt
Pt − (1 + γ)1−α
) 1
α
Φ(Pt) =
( 1
1− α
) 1
1−α
( c¯
1− α
) 1
α
P
− α1−α
t
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FIGURE 1. Institutional regions and dynamics
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of output for themselves. The opportunity cost of these guards is particularly high when
population is very low, which explains both the slope of Ω(Pt) and the condition that
Pt > (1 + γ)
1−α.
SF is the free labor region, in which Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt) and Pt > 1/α. Pt > 1/α
ensures that population is great enough that the average product has fallen, making
enclosure worthwhile. At ≤ Ψ(Pt) occurs when population growth pushes down wages
sufficiently relative to the costs of keeping slaves. The condition that Φ(Pt) ≤ At is of
less interest, driven by an assumption that the wage is bounded below by c¯. SE occurs
in the remainder of the state space, where average product and the counterfactual wage
are both relatively high.
The dynamics of the model are Malthusian and Boserupian. They are Malthusian in
that fertility is increasing in income. Two upward-sloping zero population growth lines
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exist – one under slavery and one under both egalitarianism and free labor. To the left
of these, income is high and population is growing. To the right, income is low and
population is falling. These are shown in Figure 1 as LE/F (Pt) and LS(Pt).
5
The dynamics are Boserupian in that agricultural technology in period t + 1 has an
intercept of A¯ and depends positively on both At and Pt. Lagerlo¨f (2009) takes A¯ as
the “minimum level of agricultural technology,” and I interpret it as exogenous land
quality. The result is an upward-sloping zero-technological-growth line LA(Pt).
6 Above
this, productivity degrades, while below this it improves. This is also shown in Figure 1.
A steady state exists where either LE/F (Pt) or LS(Pt) intersects LA(Pt). Figure 1 depicts
a steady state in the free labor region.
2.3. Tests. What are the testable implications of this model and, by extension, the land
abundance view? First, land quality A¯ should positively predict the existence of land
rights and slavery. Land rights do not exist under egalitarianism, and if A¯ is too low, it
is impossible to support a steady state under either regime. Similarly, A¯ must be high in
order for a steady state to exist with slavery. However, since larger values of A¯ can sup-
port steady states in both the slavery and free labor regions, the relationship between A¯
and slavery is expected to be weaker than for land rights. Second, population density,
which I take as corresponding to Pt in the model, will predict land rights and slavery.
While this is an endogenous variable, this is still a correlation implied by the model. For
land rights to exist, Pt must be greater than the cutoffs implied by Ω(Pt), 1/α, and Φ(Pt).
For slavery to exist, Pt must be great enough that enclosure of land is worthwhile and
the opportunity costs of coercion are not too high, but also sparse enough that wages
are not too low. It must, then, be between the cutoffs implied by Ω(Pt) and Ψ(Pt). It is the
implied relationships between land quality, population density, land rights, and slavery
that I test in assessing the ability of the “land abundance view” to explain pre-colonial
institutions in Africa.
5
LE/F (Pt) =
( q
β
) 1
α
Pt
LS(Pt) = (1 + γ)
1−α
α
( q
β
+ c¯
) 1
α
Pt
6LA(Pt) = A¯+D
1
θPt.
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2.4. Other implications of the model. In addition to land quality, A¯ and the state vari-
able, Pt, which I use to test the land abundance view, there are seven exogenous pa-
rameters in the model. I do not use these to derive additional tests of the model. Three
parameters, β, q and α, do not yield clear predictions for the existence of land rights
or slavery. The remaining parameters, γ, D, θ and c¯, do give clear comparative statics;
for details, see the Appendix. The difficulty with these implications is that γ, D, θ and
c¯ are not directly observed in geographic data in the same sense that A¯ and Pt are di-
rectly observed. The geographic controls I use are likely to affect several parameters at
once. Ruggedness, for example, may increase the cost of guarding slaves (γ) through the
mechanisms identified by Nunn and Puga (2011), but will be also impact technological
parameters (θ, D, and α) directly, since feasible agricultural systems differ between flat
and rugged areas.
3. DATA AND SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, I outline how I test the two predictions of the model described above.
I use a cross section of data on 1,206 societies. In Section 3.1 I detail the specific econo-
metric specifications that I use. In Section 3.2, I describe the sources of data on insti-
tutions, the proxies for the variables A¯ and Pt in the model, and the additional controls
that I include.
3.1. Specifications. The first prediction of the model is that raising A¯ will make it pos-
sible for steady states to exist with land rights or slavery. I test this by estimating:
yi = α + βAAi + x
′
iγ + i,(5)
where yi is an outcome of interest for soceity i,Ai is a proxy for land quality (analogous
to A¯ in the model), xi is a vector of geographical controls, and i is random error. (5)
is estimated as a probit with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. I expect that
βA > 0 when yi is an indicator for land rights or slavery.
The second implication of the model is that land rights exist at higher levels of Pt,
while slavery exists at intermediate levels of Pt. I test these by estimating:
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yi = α + βp ln(1 + pi) + x
′
iγ + i,(6)
and
yi = α + βp1 ln(1 + pi) + βp2(ln(1 + pi))
2 + x′iγ + i,(7)
where (abusing notation) yi, xi, and i are defined as in (5). pi is population density,
the proxy used for Pt. The unusual functional form comes from a visual inspection of
the data – slavery peaks towards the left hand side of the distribution, while a strict loga-
rithmic specification gives undue influence to very sparsely settled societies. These are
also estimated as probit models. I expect that βp > 0, βp1 > 0, and βp2 < 0. I estimate
equations with log population density and land quality separately, since the correlation
between the two (ρ = 0.36) inhibits joint tests. I do not report results of the land rights
regression with the quadratic term, since an inverse-U relationship is not anticipated by
the model. If I do estimate the equation with the quadratic term, that term not statisti-
cally significant.
3.2. Data. I use two types of data to test the ability of the model to explain institutional
differences across societies. Details of the variables used and their sources are con-
tained in the data appendix. The first covers institutions, and is taken from Murdock’s
(1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Published in 29 installments of the journal Ethnology be-
tween 1962 and 1980, the Atlas is a database of 1267 societies from around the world.
It contains categorical variables describing several institutional and cultural features of
these societies, often at the time of first contact with Europeans. From this sample, I re-
move 2 duplicate observations (the Chilcotin and Tokelau), 8 societies from before 1500
(Anc Egypt, Aryans, Babylonia, Romans, Icelander, Uzbeg, Khmer, Hebrews), and 51 for
which land quality information is missing (mostly small Pacific islands). This leaves a
base sample of 1206 societies. 801 of these have data on land rights, 1041 on slavery.
I use variables from the Ethnographic Atlas to construct binary variables for whether
land rights or slavery exist. Summary statistics for these are given in Table 1. For each
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics
[Table 1 here]
society, I observe land rights and slavery together at a single point in time. I map these
variables by the latitude and longitude coordinates of each society in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Land rights and slavery
Land rights are on top, slavery on bottom. Black circles indicate presence, grey circles absence.
Why use this data? The principal justification is availability. This is the only source
of cross-cultural information on land rights and slavery of which I am aware that has
global scope. The only other alternative, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS)
of Murdock and White (1969), is a derivative of the Ethnographic Atlas. It contains a
smaller sample of societies and a greater number of ethnographic variables. Through-
out the analysis, I validate the measures I use by showing that they are correlated with
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alternatives from the SCCS. In addition, the measures in the Ethnographic Atlas are in-
ternally consistent, having been compiled by the same author.
The greatest concern with these data are that they may be anachronistic. They are
intended to cover societies at an idealized, timeless moment of first European descrip-
tion. In practice, many of the observations are constructed from the works of colonial
anthropologists. It is clear from Figure 2 that most of the observations are intended to be
descriptions of the past, uncontaminated by colonial rule. While colonial governments
generally abolished slavery sooner or later, what is coded in the data is what anthropol-
ogists recorded as a society’s “historical” institutions; there is still much slavery in Africa
according to the Atlas. In so far as the date at which a society is observed is a proxy for
colonial effects and the severity of measurement error, I control for it in the analysis.
The second type of data used includes features of the natural environment. I join
these to the data from the Ethnographic Atlas using one of five map sources. First, I join
African societies to one or more ethnic groups mapped by Murdock (1959) in his “Tribal
Map of Africa.” Second, I merge First Nations groups in the United States and Canada
with the maps that begin the volumes the Handbook of North American Indians (Heizer
et al., 1978), digitized for the United States by Dippel (2010) and for Canada by myself.
Third, I join ethnic groups from the rest of the world to Global Mapping International’s
(GMI) detailed World Language Mapping System. Fourth, if no match can be found
in the GMI map, I use the less detailed Geo-Referencing Ethnic Groups (GREG) map
created by Weidmann et al. (2010). Finally, if no suitable match can be found in any of
these, I match groups with modern administrative boundaries manually. For example,
the Dieri are matched with Australia’s “Unincorporated Far North,” while the Nunivak
are matched to Nunivak Island. Not all societies are matched exactly. Of 1,267, 100 were
matched to a different group indicated in the same location (such as the Wiyambitu
matched to the Shoshone Panamint) while 76 were matched to a larger group of which
they form a smaller part (such as the Efik to the Ibibio). A full table of matches are given
in the web appendix.
Once these matches are formed, geographic raster data is joined to them by taking
the average of the raster points within an ethnic group’s territory. Summary statistics for
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these variables are presented in Table 1. Two of these controls are of particular impor-
tance – land quality and population density.
3.2.1. Land quality. The variable used to capture land quality is based on Fischer et al.’s
(2002) measure of combined climate, soil and terrain slope constrains. This is re-scaled
as a standard normal variable between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating an absence
of environmental constrains on rainfed agriculture. This is treated as a proxy for the
variable A¯ in the model.
The constraints measure was constructed as part of the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) methodology.7 This methodology
combines multiple sources of data on climate, soils, and landform to quantify the ex-
pected productivity of all feasible land use and management options on a global scale.
The constraints measure is not particular to any particular crop or technology, and is a
non-additive combination of three components:
(1) Climate constraints: The coldness constraint is “moderate” if there are fewer than
180 days with an average temperature below 5◦C, and “severe” if there are fewer
than 120. Aridity constraints are moderate if there are less than 120 days with an
average temperature below 5◦C during which moisture conditions are adequate
to permit crop growth and severe if there are less than 60.
(2) Soil constraints: Five characteristics of soils are considered. These are depth,
fertility, drainage, texture and chemical constraints. “Medium” and “shallow”
depth are moderate and severe constraints, respectively. “Medium” and “low”
fertility are treated similarly as moderate and severe constraints. “Poor” drainage
is a severe constraint. Sandy and stony soils are severe constraints, and cracking
clay is a moderate constraint. Salinity, sodicity, and gypsum are severe chemical
constraints.
(3) Terrain slope constraints: Terrain slopes greater than 8% are “moderate” con-
straints, and slopes greater than 30% are “severe.”
Climate constraints and soil texture are clearly exogenous. Given the manner in which
they are measured, it is unlikely that terrain slope, drainage, and chemical constraints
7See http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm
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are consequences of institutions. It is possible, however, that societies that developed
slavery or rights over land were able to avoid degrading soil depth or fertility. Since these
are only two components of a larger measure, the bias should be small. In addition, I
add the direct measures of soil depth and fertility constraints as additional controls as a
robustness check. All results for land quality are robust to the inclusion of soil depth and
fertility as separate control variables. An additional advantage of this constraints-based
measure is that it is not based on expected yields in contemporary agriculture, in which
greater crop diversity would be available than for many of the societies at the time they
are recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.
3.2.2. Population density. All historical reconstructions of population are guesses. One
book on estimates for pre-Columbian America is entitled “Numbers from Nowhere”
(Henige, 1998). The principal measure that I use for historical population density is
taken from the History Database of the Global Environment (HYDE) version 3.1, which
has been previously used by Bluedorn et al. (2009). This is raster data on historical pop-
ulation, covering the years 1500, 1600, and every ten years since 1700. For each ethnic
group, I measure historical population density as the average of the raster points within
its territory for the year of observation recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.8
These population estimates were assembled by the Netherlands Environmental As-
sessment Agency, and the details of their construction are reported by Bouwman et al.
(2006), Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010) and Klein Goldewijk (2005). This data source takes
as its base a new map of 3441 administrative units from 222 countries, at the ISO3166-2
level. Historical data are then reconstructed on this base map using Lahmeyer (2004),
Helders (2000), Tobler (1995), several local studies, interpolation, and back projection.
The data are reported on a five minute grid.
My key estimates of land quality and population density are plotted together in Figure
3. In addition to summary statistics in Table 1, I present the percentiles of the HYDE
population data and the two principal alternatives, described below. These range from
8For computational reasons, I use data from each 50 year interval, imputing intermediate years exponen-
tially.
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nearly zero persons per square mile for several groups in the Mato Grosso and interior
Amazon, to over 3,000 persons per square mile for the Okinawans of Japan.9
3.2.3. Alternative measures of population density. Because historical population recon-
struction unavoidably inexact, it is important to show that the results can be obtained
using alternatives to the HYDE estimates. Because the HYDE estimates are the only
raster data that exist on historical population, I adopt a simple method to estimate alter-
native spatially disaggregated historic population densities for the societies in my data.
I begin with raster data on population density in 1995 for each of these ethnic groups
and combine it with other estimates of historical population densities for the broader
regions within which these groups are located. Specifically, my alternative estimates of
historical population density take the form:
Historical population density =Population density in 1995×(8)
Regional density at the date of observation
Regional density in 1995
.
Critically, this assumes that the relative distribution of population has not changed
within regions over time. If the Tamil were 1.37 times as dense as the entirety of the
broad region “India” in 1995, this ratio is pushed back to 1880, the date at which they
are observed. While reasonable as a first order approximation for much of the world,
this will clearly overestimate the densities of some groups (e.g. the Wu Chinese near
modern Shanghai, or Yana of Long Island), while underestimating others. Despite this
difficulty, this approach is preferable to using the unweighted regional densities directly.
McEvedy et al. (1978), for example, assign a single population density to all of Canada.
To treat the population densities of the Inuit and Ojibwe groups in the data as equal
would be implausible, and would introduce substantial measurement error on the right
hand side.10 In addition to these two main alternatives, I use the 1995 densities directly,
9This appears to be a mis-measurement due to over-representation of Naha in the original raster data;
administrate records give a modern density of just above 1,500 persons per square mile. Results are robust
to excluding the Okinawans.
10Ruff (2006) suggests that the Northeast had a population density at contact roughly seven times that of
the Arctic. The method used here assigns the Ojibwe a historic population density of 2.20 per square mile
and the Copper Eskimo a population density of 0.31 per square mile – a roughly seven-fold difference.
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the historical regional densities directly, and for roughly 175 societies I have access to
independent estimates of their population densities from the SCCS.
While GIS data on population in 1995 is readily available from the FAO-GAEZ, his-
torical regional estimates are harder to come by. The most commonly used source for
economists is McEvedy et al. (1978), who create estimates at regular intervals for 163
regions of the world. There are, however, well-known problems with these data (Austin,
2008b; Hopkins, 2009). As a result, I also use the ARVE Group’s estimates, constructed
by Krumhardt (2010).11 She incorporates additional estimates and corrections from Du-
rand (1977), Clark (1967), Biraben (1979), Dobyns (1966), and Nevle and Bird (2008),
among others. She divides the world into 209 regions, and gives population estimates
for hundred year periods between 6050 BC and 1850 AD. I impute values between these
years, and between these years and 1995 using exponential trends.12 I use McEvedy et al.
(1978) data as a robustness check and impute values for intermediate years by the same
method. Where McEvedy et al. (1978) report country-level estimates in recent years and
broad regions (e.g. “The Sahel States”) in earlier years, I divide the population among
countries according to their ratio in the earliest year that they are separately reported.
3.2.4. Other controls. In addition, I control for several other factors that may determine
the existence of land rights and slavery. To make the econometric results easier to inter-
pret, these are re-scaled as standard normal variables. Precise definitions and sources
for these variables are outlines in the data appendix. These are the presence of a major
river, distance to the coast, elevation, the percentage of the society’s territory in which
malaria is endemic, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, date of observation, abso-
lute latitude, share desert, and an indicator for whether the society derives most of its
income from fishing. Summary statistics for these controls are given in Table 1. The
other parameters of the model, (c¯, β, α, γ, q, D, and θ) are not observed directly in the
data. These geographic variables are intended to control for these as much as is possi-
ble, as well as for factors outside the model that may contribute to the existence of land
rights and slavery.
11See http://ecospriv4.epfl.ch/index.php?dir=pub/&file=pop_landuse_data.tar.gz
12Population density estimates for 1995 were obtained from the World Bank for country-level regions, and
populstat.info for sub-national regions.
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FIGURE 3. Land quality and historic population density
Land quality is on top, population density on bottom. Darker colors indicate higher values; the ranges of
both are given in Table 1.
Access to a major river and distance from the coast proxy for water-borne diseases
that affect q (e.g. Miguel and Kremer (2004)). These distances also capture the pres-
ence of trade, which affects both α and β through the menu of goods that are traded
and through technological transfer. They will affect the cost of slavery (γ) through what
uses exist for slaves and whether they can be punished by sale for export (Lovejoy, 2000,
p. 4). Proximity to markets also affects the benefit of children (hence β) through their
use as substitutes for insurance and savings (Bloom and Sachs, 1998, p. 249). Elevation
is related to the disease environment, and hence the cost of children (q). It also affects
the range of available crops and technologies, and hence α. McCann (1999, p. 38-39) for
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example, notes that the Ethiopian highlands were a unique source of crops such as teff
and supported both animal husbandry and use of the plough.
Malaria affects q through child mortality and γ via slave mortality. It may also alter the
physical cost of effort in adults (Gallup and Sachs, 2001, p. 94-95). Malaria and absolute
latitude are both also for the unobservable features of the tropics that make their insti-
tutions systematically different from those in other parts of the world.13 Precipitation
determines what crops can be grown, shaping α. African growing seasons and diseases
are constrained by the seasonal availability of moisture (McCann, 1999, p. 15-18). Ar-
eas with low rainfall are also those most susceptible to drought (Bloom and Sachs, 1998,
p. 222); β and γ accounting for storage needs will be greater. Ruggedness, as discussed
above, γ, α and D. Temperature affects the physical cost of effort (Landes, 1998, p. 4),
and hence γ and β. In hostile environments such as deserts, it is more difficult for slaves
to flee; γ is lower.14 Temperature affects q through nutrition and disease (McIntosh,
2009, p. 87).
The analysis generally treats the ethnic groups in the sample as if they are in their
steady states. This is, of course, an abstraction. The date of observation, then, is a proxy
for the degree of European influence and other institutional contamination that, in gen-
eral, pushes societies towards a Westernized recognition of land rights and abolition of
slavery. If these societies were to be viewed at another point in time, there is no guaran-
tee that they would possess the same institutions. Most of the societies that are recorded
in the Ethnographic Atlas as having practiced slavery in the past no longer do so in the
present day.
The control for fishing is included with the Pacific Northwest in mind. Here, groups
such as the Haida used slaves in fishing and hunting, and were able to capture them
using canoe raids (Donald, 1997). This region is well known for having a relatively high
surplus and developed material culture despite the lack of importance of agriculture.
For groups with easy access to fish and an economy not centered on agriculture, land
13I report results excluding absolute latitude in Table A3 in the appendix. Results are similar without this
control, though the quadratic term on population density becomes marginally insignificant in the slavery
equation. The population density at which slavery peaks, roughly 116 persons per square mile, between
the 90th and 95th percentiles of the distribution.
14Isaacman et al. (1980, p. 598) makes a similar point in discussing the difficulties faced by refugees who
fled colonial rule in northern Mozambique.
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quality may be a poor measure of A¯ in the model. This is why Nieboer (1900), one of
the first ethnographers to link slavery to land abundance, formulated his view more
generally, in terms of the abundance of resources in general.
4. RESULTS
4.1. In pictures. It is useful, first, to know whether the correlations predicted by the
model are apparent in the raw data. Because the dependent variables are binary, a scat-
terplot will not represent the relationship clearly. Instead, I show the correlations be-
tween land rights, slavery, land quality and population density by dividing the sample
into percentiles of land quality and historic population density. In Figure 4, I report the
fraction of societies in each percentile that have land rights. In Figure 5, I do the same
for slavery. The raw correlations are as predicted. Land rights are strongly positively
related to land quality and population density. Slavery is positively correlated with land
quality, though this is much weaker than the relationship for land rights. In the model,
the existence of multiple steady states helps explain this. I do confirm below that the
correlation is statistically significant. Further, slavery is most prevalent in societies with
intermediate population densities.
4.2. Regressions. In Table 2, I report the results of estimating (5), (6) and (7). Specifi-
cally, I report the marginal effects for the land rights and population density variables.
For land quality, these can be interpreted as the effects of a one standard deviation im-
provement. When additional controls are added, the results suggest that a one standard
deviation improvement in land quality raises the probability that land rights exist by
roughly 4.5%. Interpreting the coefficient on population density as an elasticity, a 1%
increase in population density is associated with a 0.124% increase in the chance that
land rights exist.15 A one standard deviation increase in land quality predicts a 4.7%
increase in the chance of slavery. While the coefficients on the quadratic term for pop-
ulation density are less easy to interpret, the inverted-U probability profile visible in
Figure 5 is visible here. The level of historic population density at which slavery peaks,
given by eβp1/(2βp2), is reported in the table. With controls, this is 71 persons per square
15This is a reasonable approximation, though not strictly correct, because the normalization is log(1+pop.
den.), not log(pop. den.).
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FIGURE 4. Land rights by percentiles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with land rights. The top picture divides this by twenty percentiles
of land quality, each representing 5% of the sample. The bottom picture by percentiles of population
density.
TABLE 2. Main results
[Table 2 here]
mile, which between the 85th and the 90th percentiles of the data. This is similar to the
pattern in Figure 5.
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FIGURE 5. Slavery by percentiles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this into twenty percentiles of
land quality, each representing 5% of the sample. The bottom picture by similar percentiles of population
density.
5. ROBUSTNESS: WHAT THE MODEL CAN EXPLAIN
In this section, I show that the results in Section 4 are robust to several objections
that could be raised against them. I show that they can be replicated using alternative
measures of land rights and slavery, and that the measures used for the dependent vari-
ables are correlated with other measures of these in other samples not large enough to
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TABLE 3. Alternative measures of the dependent variables
[Table 3 here]
be used for replicating the results. Second, I show that similar results can be obtained
using different estimates of both land rights and land quality, and that these alternative
measures are correlated with those used for the analysis. Third, I show that the results
generally survive additional robustness checks – for the importance of influential obser-
vations, for the possible endogeneity of land quality, and for alternative clustering of the
standard errors. Fourth, while I acknowledge that the data provide only limited scope
for testing the model against alternative explanations of land rights and slavery, I argue
that the model performs well against notable competing theories.
5.1. Alternative measures of the dependent variables. Because land rights and slavery
are sharp indicators of the existence of these institutions, I use alternative measures of
each. Land rights in particular exist for some 74% of societies in the data, but do not
necessarily capture differences in how well defined these rights are. I begin by demon-
strating that my measure of land rights is positively correlated with v1726 in the SCCS,
an indicator for whether land is mostly private. The SCCS is a sub-sample of 186 of
the more well-documented societies from the Ethnographic Atlas, to which researchers
have been continually adding new variables since its creation. These variables are not,
however, regularly available for all 186 societies. Because v1726 is only available for 80
societies, I am not able to replicate the econometric analysis with it. The results of re-
gressing the existence of land rights on v1726 are positive and significant, as reported in
column (1) of Table 3.
Next, I use an indicator for whether the inheritance of land is patrilineal as an alter-
native measure of land rights.16 Following Goody (1969), this captures the degree to
which the control of real property is directed towards the nuclear family. Roughly, this
is one step along the transition from weakly defined to strongly defined rights in land.
Similarly, I use an indicator for whether land is inherited by sons.17 I show in columns
16Like the indicator for land rights, this is constructed using V74: Inheritance Rule for Real Property
(Land). This is equal to 1 if V74=4, V74=5, V74=6, or V74=7.
17This is equal to 1 if V74=7.
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TABLE 4. Alternative measures of land quality and population density
[Table 4 here]
(2) through (5) of Table 3 that both of these are positively related to land quality and
population density, conditional on the other controls.
For slavery, I can make similar tests. First, I show in column (6) of Table 3 that the
main measure of slavery is correlated with an indicator constructed from v919 of the
SCCS for the existence of large-scale slaveholding. In columns (7) through (10), I show
that the results can be mostly replicated by constructing alternative measures of slav-
ery from the Ethnographic Atlas. Slavery is recorded as either “absent” (1), “incipient
or nonhereditary” (2) “reported but type not identified” (3), or “hereditary and socially
significant” (4). I create a “slavery above incipient” dummy for whether V 70 > 2, and a
“hereditary slavery” dummy for V 70 = 4. The positive conditional correlation between
land quality and non-incipient slavery is still apparent, as are the hump-shaped rela-
tionships with population density, though the link between land quality and hereditary
slavery is small and statistically insignificant.
5.2. Alternative measures of land quality and population density. I validate the use of
the land quality measure by showing that it is strongly correlated with three alternative
measures of land quality contained in the SCCS – v921, v924 and v928. This is reported
in columns (1) through (3) of Table 4.
The use of population density in 1995 to weight ethnic groups within regions is ne-
cessitated by data availability. Further, the regional population density estimates are
themselves no more than educated guesses. My approach here is to replicate the results
with alternative proxies. In column (4) of Table 4, I show that the main measure of pop-
ulation density is correlated with an indicator of land shortage (v1720) from the SCCS.
In Columns (5) through (10), I show that the main results for land rights and slavery can
be replicated with three alternative measures of population density – density in 1995,
and densities computed using regional estimates computed using density in 1995 as an
intra-regional weight and McEvedy et al. (1978) or ARVE estimates as regional densities.
If the principal measure of historical population density is replaced for Canada and the
United States with the estimates reported in Ruff (2006), the results (not reported) are
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TABLE 5. Correlations of population density measures
[Table 5 here]
very similar to those given in Table 2. If I do not weight these regional densities, I find
an inverse-U but insignificant relationship with slavery using the McEvedy et al. (1978),
and a significant inverse-U using the ARVE data (not reported).
In addition, there are two variables in the SCCS (v64 and v1130) that create indepen-
dent estimates of the population densities of several societies in the data. These are not
continuous measures, but instead categorize the societies into bins. While there are not
enough observations and the data are too coarse to replicate the econometric analy-
sis, I show in Figures 6 and 7 that these alternative measures have similar relationships
with the institutions of interest as the main measure. Land rights are increasing in both
measures of population density, and slavery has a hump-shaped relationship with each.
How similar are these alternative measures of population density? In Table 5, I report
Spearman rank correlations and correlation coefficients between the various measures
used. For the African sub-sample, I add population density in 1960 as estimated by the
UNEP.18 While some of these measures are more strongly correlated than others, they
are all significant at the 1% level. What general lesson can be taken away from this? His-
torical population density estimates are untrustworthy. They are correlated with each
other, but at times they disagree even about the relative rankings of societies by popu-
lation density. Even still, they agree on two conclusions. Land rights have existed where
population was densest, and slavery was most likely at intermediate values of popula-
tion density, as in the model and consistent with the literature on African history.
5.3. Other robustness checks. In Table 6, I test whether the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of influential observations and sub-samples. I begin by re-estimating the re-
sults by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and computing both leverage and dfbeta statis-
tics for the variables of interest. In the slavery quadratic, this calculated for the linear
term. In columns (1) through (4) and (11) through (14), it is clear that the results do
not depend on including these observations. In columns (5), (6), (15), and (16), I repli-
cate the results excluding both North and South America. The results are unchanged
18See http://na.unep.net/metadata/unep/GRID/AFPOP60.html.
26 JAMES FENSKE
FIGURE 6. Land rights by bins of population density in the SCCS
The y axis is the percentage of societies with land rights. The top picture divides this by population density
bins according to v64, while the bottom picture does so following v1130.
excepting that the relationship between slavery and land quality becomes small and
insignificant. This is surprising, as slavery was most prominent in areas of the Pacific
Northwest where agriculture was unimportant.
Dropping Europeans (columns 7-8 and 17-18) and their offshoots does not change the
results by much. Excluding non-agricultural societies (columns 9-10 and 19-20) com-
pletely eliminates the relationship between land quality and land rights, suggesting that
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FIGURE 7. Slavery by bins of population density in the SCCS
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this by population density
bins according to v64, while the bottom picture does so following v1130.
TABLE 6. Influential observations
[Table 6 here]
this is driven by better land quality permitting the existence of settled agriculture. This
highlights a mechanism by which societies move from SE to SS, rather than providing
evidence against the model.
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TABLE 7. Possible endogeneity of land quality
[Table 7 here]
No sub-set of the data are determining all of the results. In Table A1 in the appendix,
I list the most ten most influential societies by dfbeta for each of the major coefficients
of interest. The societies that drive the relationships between land rights and the two
variables of interest are not concentrated in any one region. For the correlation of land
quality with slavery, four of the ten most influential societies are slave-holding Ameri-
can Indian groups concentrated in the fertile parts of the prairies. For the positive coef-
ficient on the log of historical population density, three of the most influential societies
are moderately populated slave-owning societies of Central Asia. Three of the ten most
influential societies for the negative coefficient on the quadratic population term are in
Northern India and do not possess slaves.
I am not concerned here with possible reverse causation of population density. The
model expects that population growth will respond to institutions, and I am only test-
ing a correlation between two endogenous variables. Even if I were seeking a one-way
causal impact, it is unlikely that an instrumental variable exists that could alter popula-
tion levels on a macroeconomic scale without also affecting institutions.
I am, however, potentially concerned about the endogeneity of land quality. The FAO
measure is an index of several constraints, of which soil depth and soil fertility may be
potentially human-caused. In Table 7 I address this concern by controlling directly for
these components. If the entire relationship between the variables of interest and land
quality can be explained by correlation with these potentially endogenous components,
it is evidence that the causal inference may be spurious. The results show, however, that
the result survives separating land quality into its separate parts.
Finally, I have reported results with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. How
sensitive is the statistical inference to correlations in the errors within possible clusters?
I address this question in Table 8, clustering the standard errors by ethnographic region
(of which there are 60), by the principal country of the ethnic group, or by that country’s
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TABLE 8. Alternative clusters (p. values)
[Table 8 here]
global region classified by the UN.19 The “robust” errors are the baseline results. The
results are generally stable, though clustering by country pushes the p. values of the
population quadratic to 0.15. The major exception is that slavery is not significantly
related to land quality if the results are made robust to arbitrary correlation by country
or by UN region. This foreshadows the results of Section 6, suggesting that there are
strong correlations in institutions within broad regions.
5.4. Other theories of land rights. In this section, I contrast the model with other ex-
planations of land rights. The two most influential explanations of rights over land are
those of Boserup (1965) and Demsetz (1967). Boserup (1965) argues that exogenous
population increase is the principal driver of agricultural intensification and more per-
manent tenure. This is the intuition captured by the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model; an increase
in Pt pushes down the average product of land under egalitarianism, creating incentives
for the elite to enclose it. Other formalizations of this argument have captured these
changes as the selection of a new, more intensive production technology in response to
changes in the relative scarcity of land and labor (e.g. Hayami (1997); Quisumbing and
Otsuka (2001)).
The strong correlation of population density and land rights identified in Section 4
supports this view. Further, this result supports the model against informal critiques
of Boserup (1965) that have argued that population pressure can lead to multiple out-
comes, including open access (e.g. Baland and Platteau (1998)). The tendency in the
data is for population pressure to be associated with more defined rights. These data do
not, of course, allow the model to be tested against all possible mechanisms by which
population density is positively correlated with the existence of rights over land. Ideal
data would, for example, indicate whether it was the political elite that had instigated
enclosure. I am not aware, however, of the existence of data with this level of detail
and global coverage. Note that the model does allow for population to be endogenous
19Ethnic groups were classified according to the location of their centroid, and then obvious errors were
corrected manually. For example, the centroids for the Japanese and Annamese fall outside of Japan and
Vietnam, respectively.
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to institutions. Specific alternatives can be evaluated. It may be supposed, for exam-
ple, that population density affects land rights only through the existence of states. Re-
estimating (6) separately for stateless societies and those with states, however, gives a
positive and significant coefficient on historic population density in both sub-samples
(not shown).20
Demsetz (1967), by contrast, focuses on trade. He argues that land rights will emerge
to internalize externalities when the gains outweigh the costs. This drives enclosure of
the commons in the formal treatments of Hotte et al. (2000) or Copeland and Taylor
(2009). This also explains the empirical results of Bogart and Richardson (2010), and is
similar to the greater effort expended in defending rights over more valuable resources
predicted by models of the economics of conflict (e.g. Baker (2003); Grossman and Kim
(1995)). These motivations are not inconsistent with the land abundance view, and are
in fact incorporated into Austin’s (2008a) account of it. The data here do not include any
direct information on trade. Interestingly, the two controls that best capture trade in the
data – distance from the coast and access to a major river – do not significantly predict
the existence of land rights in Table 2.
Beyond these two influential theories of land rights, there is a literature on the enclo-
sure of common property. Some contributions, e.g. de Meza and Gould (1992) examine
the efficiency of enclosure without describing the conditions that give rise to it. Others
(e.g. Baland and Francois (2005); Baland and Platteau (2003); Grantham (1980); Lueck
(1994); Netting (1976); Ostrom (1991); Runge (1986)) identify several benefits of com-
mon property that help explain why it survives. These include scale economies, risk
pooling, exclusion and effort costs, and equity concerns. Again, none of these expla-
nations exclude land abundance as an explanation of weakly defined land rights. Most
of these variables are not available in the data, making it impossible to test the land
abundance view against these theories. The exception to this is risk. In Table 9, I add a
measure of harvest risk to the analysis, including the coefficient of variation of annual
rainfall over the period 1950-1999.21 In column (1), there is a significant negative coeffi-
cient; without additional controls, it does appear that added risk helps explain a lack of
20“Stateless” societies and those with states are defined according to V 33 of the Ethnographic Atlas, which
captures jurisdictional hierarchy above the local community
21Data here come from the University of Delaware Center for Climatic Research.
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TABLE 9. Alternative theories
[Table 9 here]
rights to land, though this does not diminish the direct effect of land quality. Adding log
population density or the full set of controls, however, leads the effect of risk to become
insignificant.
5.5. Other theories of slavery. Though not a conventional topic, several theoretical
analyses of slavery and coercion exist (e.g. Barzel (1977); Bergstrom (1971); Canarella
and Tomaske (1975); Findlay (1975); Genicot (2002)). Some, e.g. Conning (2004), for-
mally capture the same intuition as Nieboer (1900) or Domar (1970), which is the basis
of the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model. In this section, I contrast the results outlined in Section 4
with two broad explanations of slavery and explain why the model outlined in Section 2
remains a solid explanation of African slavery.
First, there several theories that emphasize coerced workers’ outside options. These
include what Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) refer to as the “neo-Malthusian” expla-
nations of the decline of serfdom. North and Thomas (1971), for example, hold that
serfs voluntarily exchanged their labor for protection from lords. These payments were
in inputs rather than money because of the limited nature of output markets. Criti-
cally, North and Thomas (1971) suggest that lower population densities after the black
death led lords to compete for labor, weakening serfdom.22 Several models find that
worse outside options for workers increase the degree of coercion in labor contracts (Be-
ber and Blattman, 2011; Chwe, 1990; Naidu and Yuchtman, 2011). Similarly, Acemoglu
and Wolitzky (2011) find that labor scarcity has two effects, raising coercion through a
Domar-type increase in the price of output, but also reducing coercion by improving
workers outside options.
If workers’ outside options help explain the existence of slavery, this does not rule out
labor scarcity as an explanation. Workers’ outside options are not directly observed in
the data, making it impossible to test the model against this explanation directly. Fol-
lowing the narrative of Nunn and Puga (2011), ruggedness is expected to improve the
22Writers such as Inikori (1999) have suggested that African “slaves” held a position closer to that of the
European serf. In the model, slaves differ from free laborers in that they are coerced workers whose price
does not depend on the local supply of labor. The severity of slavery is not important to this conceptual
distinction.
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outside option of slaves, by making it easier for them to flee enslavement. Contrary to
this intuition, however, the marginal effect ruggedness on slavery in Table 2 is positive.
Similarly, interacting land quality with ruggedness and including the interaction in (5)
does not diminish the main effect of land quality on slavery, and interacting log histor-
ical population density and its square with ruggedness and including these in (7) does
not diminish either of the main effects (not reported)
There are at least four reasons why the North and Thomas (1971) model in particular
cannot explain Africa. First, that model’s applicability to any case has been called into
question by Fenoaltea (1975), who demonstrates that North and Thomas (1971) err in
treating serfdom as voluntary, underestimate the transactions costs in labor contracts,
misidentify the historical trends that acted on the manorial system, and overemphasize
the rigidity of “custom” in constraining institutional change. Second, both land qual-
ity and population density at low levels have been shown in Section 4 to be positively
associated with slavery. In the North and Thomas (1971) model, these should promote
the development of trade and markets, lessening the need for contracts to be written
in labor dues. Third, their model predicts that trade will discourage the use of serfs.
This runs counter to the literature on African history, which has shown that external
trade in particular spurred greater use of slaves in production (e.g. Lovejoy (2000) or
Law (1995)). Finally, there is no evidence that African slaves received payments that ap-
proximated their marginal products. In many cases, slaveowners had to be compelled
to receive manumission payments from their slaves under colonial rule, suggesting that
they were earning rents for which they needed to be compensated. Austin (2009) pro-
vides several examples from nineteenth century West Africa in which it was possible for
the purchaser of a slave to recoup his investment within six years.
The second set of theories I address argue that, in certain contexts, slavery is more
productive than free labor, which explains its use. For Fenoaltea (1984), this occurs
where “pain incentives” are effective and detailed care by the worker is unnecessary.
Fogel and Engerman (1974) link the exceptional productivity of slaves in the American
south to economies of scale that could only be achieved through gang labor, an activity
so grueling that free men could not be induced to take part at any price. Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997), similarly, argue that the cultivation of crops with economies of scale is
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more conducive to slavery. Hanes (1996) explains the concentration of slaves in rural
and domestic production by invoking the high turnover costs in these industries.
These arguments again cannot alone explain slavery in Africa, even if they can ex-
plain it in other contexts. First, there is no evidence that slaves were used in produc-
tion in sectors systematically different than those dominated by free peasants. The fact
that, over a few generations, slaves were often partly assimilated into their masters’ so-
cieties is evidence that they were not kept in economic isolation (Austin, 2009). Where
large slave communities or communities were present, (see e.g. Lovejoy (1978) for the
Sokoto Caliphate or Oroge (1971) for nineteenth century Yorubaland), these existed not
because slaves were used in economic tasks that free peasants were not, but because
they were acquired in large numbers by authorities and other elites. Studies of slav-
ery in individual African societies frequently make reference to slave labor and free la-
bor working in the same tasks. Austin (2005) notes gold and kola production in Asante
were both carried out by free people, pawns, corve´e labor, slaves, and descendants of
slaves. Uchendu (1979) shows for Igbo society that slaves first were used to fill subsis-
tence needs by farming and fishing, and only secondarily filled prestige functions. “In
domestic activities,” he argues, “no operation was strictly reserved for slaves.” Describ-
ing the Kerebe of Tanzania, Hartwig (1979) writes that masters often worked alongside
their slaves, who performed the same tasks as their owners and their owners’ wives.
Second, the literature on the “legitimate commerce” period suggests that slaves were
used in the activities where labor of all kinds was most productive; in the model this is
consistent with a rise in A¯, and does not require a different production function under
slavery. The nineteenth century export markets for oils, ivory, ostrich feathers and other
goods created higher returns to slave labor, and slavery within Africa intensified (Love-
joy, 2000).23 Third, African agriculture both past and present has been overwhelmingly
characterized by diminishing or constant returns to scale (Hopkins, 1973). Without ev-
idence of scale economies, an appeal to “pain incentives” is not necessary to explain
slavery over and above a comparison of the costs of slavery to those of free labor.24
23Lynn (1997) also provides a survey of the period, while Law (1995) contains a number of case studies.
24Returning to the model, if slaves are worked harder than free laborers, their productivity may be en-
hanced by some factor η. This parameter will carry over into the definitions of Φ, Ψ, and Ω. However,
unless the shape of the production function itself changes, the qualitative shapes of the institutional re-
gions will not be different.
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TABLE 10. Results with region fixed effects
[Table 10 here]
The data only allow limited tests of the land abundance view against these arguments,
since economies of scale or the detailed care needed in production are not observed.
The FAO does, however, report the suitability of land for eight classes of rainfed crop –
wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, oil crops, sugar, and cotton. I am able to
test whether including these measures in the slavery regressions has any effect on the
results. This tests the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model against the alternative that slavery is ex-
plained by its productivity in the production of specific crops, which may be correlated
with land quality or population density. I report the results in Table 9. With one excep-
tion, none of these specific crops has a major impact on the coefficient on land quality.
The exception is maize suitability, which weakens the effect of land quality, making it
marginally insignificant. Since the main effect of maize is itself insignificant, however,
and the two variables have a high raw correlation of 0.44, this is most likely the result of
multi-collinearity.
6. HETEROGENEITY: WHAT THE MODEL CANNOT EXPLAIN
In Table 10, I show a simple method to do away with most of the results presented so
far: add fixed effects for the major ethnographic regions in the data. These are North
America, South America, Africa, the Circum-Mediterranean, the Insular Pacific, and
East Eurasia. There is still a relationship between population density and land rights,
and the marginal effect of land quality on slavery has not fallen by much, but the other
results have now disappeared completely. The model can predict differences across
broad regions, but not within them.
Why? Anthropologists have a name for the fact that institutions diffuse across soci-
eties, making it impossible to have any truly independent ethnographic observations.
This is “Galton’s problem.” Economists would refer to it either as serial correlation, or
as spatial dependence. I propose that the lack of robustness of the main results stems
from spillovers across neighboring societies. If a nearby society has slavery, it is almost
impossible to avoid developing the institution or becoming slaves of your neighbor, re-
gardless of prevailing land quality and population density. The existence of rights over
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TABLE 11. Galton’s problem
[Table 11 here]
land is an idea that can spread across societies, and can be used to defend claims against
a rival group. Within the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model, these make sense as parameter shifts
dependent on a neighboring group’s institutions. γ, for example, should be lower if a
slave who flees can only do so to another slave-holding society.
In Table 11, I provide suggestive evidence that these neighbor effects exist by esti-
mating spatial lag and spatial error models. The spatial lag adds a term ρWy to the
estimating equation. W is an N × N spatial weight matrix, in which each entry Wij is
the inverse of the distance between observation i and observation j, normalized so that
its rows sum to 1 or 0. ρ captures whether the institutional outcome of one group will
affect its neighbor’s institutions. The reason this evidence is only suggestive is that ρ
is not separately identified from localized unobservables. This is estimated as a linear
probability model using maximum likelihood.25 The spatial error model is similar. Now,
the error term is given by u = λWu+ , so that a society’s random error may depend on
the error terms for societies that are close to it.
In Table 11 it is clear that there is very strong spatial correlation in land rights. The
Wald tests for ρ and λ are very large, even conditional on the observed controls. While
I do not report the estimates of ρ and λ, all values are positive. Once these controls are
added, none of the results concerning land quality survive. The results with population
density fare better, but for slavery these are only marginally significant in the spatial
lag model. While the model can explain differences across regions, it cannot explain
differences within them, and the strong spatial correlation in institutional outcomes
suggests this is due to neighbor effects.
I confirm the ability of the model to explain differences across regions in Figures 8
and 9. I show that the relationships between the averages of land quality and popula-
tion density within an ethnographic region are correlated with the fraction of societies
possessing land rights or slavery as the model predicts. These results will differ from
the plots in ?? and ?? because the number of observations differs by region. The posi-
tive relationships of land rights with both land quality and population density are still
25In particular, I use the spatreg command in Stata.
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apparent, and the inverse-U correlation between slavery and population density is still
apparent. Only the correlation between slavery and land quality cannot be seen across
regions in the data. Once again, the existence of multiple steady states can explain this.
In Table A2, in the appendix, I report the regional means for these variables for the six
major regions of the Ethnographic Atlas.
FIGURE 8. Land rights, land quality and population density across regions
The y axis is the percentage of societies within a region with land rights. The x axis in the top picture is
average land quality for the region. In the bottom picture it is average log population density.
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FIGURE 9. Slavery, land quality and population density across regions
The y axis is the percentage of societies within a region with slavery. The x axis in the top picture is average
land quality for the region. In the bottom picture it is average log population density.
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
It appears then, that, the land abundance view performs reasonably well in predict-
ing broad differences in the prevalence of land rights and slavery between Africa and
the rest of the world, though not as well at predicting outcomes within regions. What of
other institutions discussed by historians of Africa? The relative lack of state centraliza-
tion and high rates of polygyny have also been tied to sparse population. Rulers were
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TABLE 12. Other outcomes
[Table 12 here]
unable to tie subjects to the land and tax them, sought subjects and cattle, rather than
territory, and had to contend with the ability of subjects to exit easily (Austin, 2004a,b).
Goody (1976) argues that polygyny exists where allocating land to additional wives is
less costly but their labor is valuable.
In Table 12, I replicate (5), (6) and (7) with states and polygamy as outcomes. The
prevalence of states in the global sample mimics that of rights over land, rising mono-
tonically with land quality and population density.26 Polygyny, by contrast, mimics the
pattern seen for slavery – its presence increases weakly with land quality, but is strongest
at intermediate levels of population.27 The relationships between polygyny and the con-
trols of interest are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls – malaria ecology is
sufficient to make either one insignificant. This suggests that the land abundance view
may have some power to explain the relative prevalence of states, though its application
to polygamy may be more limited.
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institu-
tions that exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior
to colonial rule. I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geography
affects institutions – by looking in depth at one hypothesis from the literature on African
history. I find that African land tenure and slavery have been decisively shaped by the
continent’s abundance of land and scarcity of labor. I find that this perspective explains
much about institutions across a global cross-section of societies, but that neighbor ef-
fects weaken its ability to predict differences within them.
These tests have made several points that must be taken into account in understand-
ing the impacts of under-population on African institutions. First, when both produc-
tivity and population are low, the opportunity cost of coercion is high, and the benefit
to creating estates is low. This explains why slavery is less common among the most
26I measure state centralization as a dummy variable, equal to one if variable 33 in the Ethnographic Atlas,
the levels of jurisdiction above the local, is greater than one.
27I measure polygyny as a dummy variable, equal to one if variable 9 in the Ethnographic Atlas, marital
composition, is 3, 4, 5, or 6. This codes outcome 2, “Independent nuclear, occasional polygyny”, as zero.
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sparsely populated societies. Africa appears not as the least populous region in the sam-
ple, but as one that of medium density. While it is comparatively more prone to slavery
than Europe or South Asia, there the is more slavery on the continent than in many parts
of the Americas. Second, greater land quality (as well as access to trade), will encour-
age increased reliance on slavery conditional on population. This explains why some of
the most agriculturally prosperous though densely populated regions in Africa, such as
Sokoto, also used slaves most intensively (cf. Hill (1985)). Finally, there are substantial
institutional spatial correlations across African societies relating to land rights and slav-
ery. These revisions to the current thinking allow the “land abundance” perspective to
better explain institutions and are borne out in comparative data.
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APPENDIX A. DATA APPENDIX
A.1. Definitions and sources of ethnographic data. Six variables are computed from
the Ethnographic Atlas:
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(1) Any slavery is an indicator for whether V 70, “Type of Slavery” is greater than 1,
which indicates “absence or near absence.” The other categories grouped to-
gether are “incipient or nonhereditary,” “reported but type not identified,” and
“hereditary and socially significant.”
(2) Any land rights is an indicator for whether V 74, “Inheritance Rule for Real Prop-
erty (land)” is greater than 1, which indicates “absence of individual property
rights.” The other categories grouped together are, first, “matrilineal (sister’s
sons),” second, “other matrilineal heirs,” third, “children, with daughters receiv-
ing less,” fourth, “children, equally for both sexes,” fifth, “other patrilineal heirs,”
and, sixth, “patrilineal (sons).”
(3) State centralization is an indicator for whether V 33, “Jurisdictional Hierarchy Be-
yond Local Community” is greater than zero. This variable ranges from zero lev-
els to four levels.
(4) Usual polygyny is an indicator for whether V 9 “Marital Composition: Monogamy
and Polygamy,’ is equal to 3 (Preferentially sororal, same dwelling), 4 (Preferen-
tially sororal, separate dwelling), 5 (Non-sororal, separate dwellings), or 6 (Non-
sororal, same dwelling). This excludes categories 1 (Independent nuclear, monog-
amous), 2 (Independent nuclear, occasional polygyny) and 7 (Independent polyan-
drous families).
(5) Date observed is the rough date at which the information on the society was
recorded. Where this is missing, I impute it using the average value for other
ethnic groups within the society’s ethnographic region, of which there are 60 in
the final sample. This is variable V 102 in the atlas.
(6) Mostly fishing is an indicator for whether the society’s percentage dependence
on fishing is greater than 50%, computed from V 3 in the Ethnographic Atlas.
A revised version of the Atlas has been made available for download in SPSS format by
J. Patrick Gray at http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/. This is the version
used for the present study.
Five variables are used from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. These are:
(1) v64: This is “Population Density.” This divides societies into categories of < 1,
1− 5, 5− 25, 26− 100, 101− 500, and > 500 persons per sqm.
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(2) v921: This is “Agricultural Potential 1: Sum of Land Slope, Soils, Climate Scales.”
It rates land quality on a scale between 4 and 23.
(3) v924: This is “Suitability of Soils for Agriculture”. It ranges soils on a scale from 0
to 8, from “very poor” to “very fair.”
(4) v928: This is “Agricultural Potential 2: Lowest of Land Slope, Soils, Climate Scales.”
It ranges soils on a scale from 0 to 8, from “very poor” to “very fair.”
(5) v1130: This is “Population Density.” This divides societies into categories of < 1,
1− 5, 5− 25, 26− 100, 101− 500, and > 500 persons per sqm.
(6) v1720: This is “land shortage,” computed by converting the variable “Causes of
Land Shortage” to 0 if there is “no land shortage” and 1 if there is “ population
pressure”, “territorial invasions,” or both.
The SCCS is available online at http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/sccs/.
A.2. Definitions and sources of population data. .
The principal data for historic population density, from HYDE, are online at ftp://
ftp.mnp.nl/hyde/hyde31_final/.
The raster data for population density in 1995, used to compute alternative historic
population density, are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/
index.htm. Regional estimates from McEvedy et al. (1978) are Heizer et al. (1978) are not
available online. The regional estimates from Krumhardt (2010) are available at http://
ecospriv4.epfl.ch/index.php?dir=pub/&file=pop_landuse_data.tar.gz. The UNEP
estimates for Africa in 1960 can be downloaded from http://na.unep.net/metadata/
unep/GRID/AFPOP60.html.
A.3. Definitions and sources of GIS data. .
The main measure of land quality has been explained in detail in the text. The Ra-
mankutty et al. (2002) alternative measure of land quality is available at http://www.
sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/.
Major river : This is a dummy that equals one if a river with a rank of at least 6 ac-
cording to the North American Cartographic Information Society (NACIS) intersects the
ethnic group’s territory. The data are taken from http://www.naturalearthdata.com/.
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Dist. to coast : This is average distance from each point in the ethnic group’s territory
to the nearest point on the coast, in decimal degrees, calculated in ArcMap.
Elevation: This is average elevation for the ethnic group. Raster data are provided by
the NACIS, downloaded from http://www.naturalearthdata.com/.
Pct. malarial: This is the fraction of the society’s territory in which malaria is en-
demic, according to the Malaria Atlas Project, downloaded from http://www.map.ox.
ac.uk/data/.
Precipitation: This is average annual precipitation (mm). Because some societies
are too small for a raster point to fall within their territory, I impute missing data us-
ing the nearest raster point. The data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/
Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
Ruggedness: This is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by Nunn and Puga (2011).
This measures the elevation distance between a raster cell and its neighbors at a fine
level. The data are downloaded from http://diegopuga.org/data/.
Temperature: This is the accumulated temperature on days with mean daily temper-
ature above 0◦C, computed using monthly data from 1961 to 2000 collected by the Cli-
mate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. I treat 55537 is as an error
code and drop these points. I impute missing values using the nearest raster point. The
data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
Absolute latitude: This is the absolute value of the latitude of the society’s centroid.
Rainfall CV.: This is the coefficient of variation of annual total rainfall over the pe-
riod 1950-1999 for the point in the rainfall data closest to the ethnic group’s centroid.
These data are taken from the University of Delaware’s Center for Climatic Research, and
are downloaded from http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/html_pages/archive.
html.
Other crop suitability. This is average suitability for the chosen rain-fed crop, accord-
ing to plates 29 through 36 of the FAO’s GAEZ project. For comparison, the general
land quality measure used in this paper is computed from plate 28. For each of these
crops, suitability is a scale between 0 and 8, where 0 indicates very high suitability and
8 indicates non-suitability. This is re-scaled so that larger values indicate greater suit-
ability, and is (like the other controls) converted to a standard normal variable for the
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regressions. The data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/
GAEZ/index.htm.
APPENDIX B. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
These are c¯, subsistence consumption, β, the exponent on fertility in the utility func-
tion, α, the exponent on productivity-augmented land in the production function, γ,
the marginal cost of guarding slaves, q, the marginal cost of fertility, D, the coefficient
on population and existing technology in the equation for technological progress, and
θ, the exponent on population in the equation for technological progress.
Three parameters of the model give ambiguous predictions. An increase in β will
make LS(Pt) and LE/F (Pt) flatter. This will not have any effect for a given At and Pt. In
the steady state, this can make slavery appear if LS(Pt) rotates downwards to intersect
LA(Pt), but can also make slavery disappear if LS(Pt) rotates downwards so that it no
longer intersects SS. For the same reason, the steady state effect on land rights will be
ambiguous. The effects of an increase in q will be the opposite of those for an increase in
β, and will be indeterminate for the same reasons. An increase in α can lead Ψ(Pt) and
Φ(Pt) to rotate upwards or downwards depending on the values of all the parameters.
The remaining parameters give clearer predictions. An increase in γ will cause both
Ψ(Pt) and Ω(Pt) to become steeper, shrinking the slavery region. Both in the steady state
and for given values ofAt andPt, this makes both slavery and land rights less likely. Rais-
ing θwill makeLA(Pt) rotate downwards. This will have no impact for a particularAt and
Pt. It will make a steady state under slavery less likely, since LA(Pt) may tilt downwards
so that it no longer intersects LS(Pt). It will also push the intersection of LE/F (Pt) and
LA(Pt) (if there is one) to the left, which may move the steady state from SF to SE. This
will make slavery and land rights less likely in the steady state. RaisingD will have oppo-
site effects. An increase in c¯will lead Ψ(Pt), Ω(Pt) and Φ(Pt) to become steeper, shrinking
both the free labor and slavery regions. It will also causeLS(Pt) to become steeper. For a
given At and Pt and in the steady state, this will make slavery and land rights less likely.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean s.d. Min Max N Pct.
Any slavery 0.54 0.50 0 1 1,041 5 0.03 0.29 0.05
Any land rights 0.74 0.44 0 1 801 10 0.09 0.60 0.18
Land quality 1.33 0.90 0 3.98 1,206 15 0.28 1.21 0.28
Date observed 1,905 53.0 1,500 1,965 1,206 20 0.57 1.93 0.50
Historic pop density 42.8 141 0 3,627 1,206 25 1.22 2.58 0.94
Precipitation 1,263 858 12.6 6,164 1,206 30 2.42 3.87 2.00
Temperature 7,203 2,774 35.5 10,830 1,206 35 3.71 5.08 3.87
Absolute latitude 20.7 17.0 0.017 78.1 1,206 40 5.82 6.64 7.13
Pct. malarial 0.17 0.20 0 0.69 1,206 45 7.75 8.29 10.21
Dist. to coast 4.26 3.87 0 16.5 1,206 50 10.14 10.14 14.81
Elevation 167 9.61 141 230 1,206 55 12.63 13.16 19.39
Major river 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,206 60 15.85 17.38 24.35
Ruggedness 121,122 132,811 137 977,941 1,206 65 20.17 22.60 32.30
Share desert 0.11 0.26 0 1 1,206 70 26.07 29.88 40.24
Mostly fishing 0.069 0.25 0 1 1,206 75 35.40 39.17 54.98
80 47.25 53.66 76.03
85 63.27 71.90 105.73
90 96.09 116.78 151.86
95 164.72 198.82 246.07
Notes: Variable definitions in text.
Table 1: Summary statistics and percentiles of population density
HYDE 
Estimate MJ Base
ARVE 
Base
Land quality 0.091*** (0.017) 0.046*** (0.018)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.161*** (0.010) 0.124*** (0.011)
Precipitation -0.047** (0.021) -0.022 (0.021)
Temperature -0.028 (0.030) -0.057* (0.032)
Date observed 0.050*** (0.019) 0.004 (0.016)
Share desert 0.010 (0.018) 0.039** (0.016)
Dist. to coast -0.023 (0.018) 0.009 (0.018)
Elevation -0.007 (0.019) 0.002 (0.018)
Pct. malarial 0.174*** (0.026) 0.127*** (0.025)
Ruggedness 0.064*** (0.017) 0.030* (0.016)
Absolute latitude -0.107*** (0.033) -0.088** (0.037)
Major river -0.031 (0.034) -0.079** (0.034)
Mostly fishing -0.125* (0.074) 0.029 (0.071)
Observations 801 801 801 801
Land quality 0.040*** (0.015) 0.047** (0.021)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.286*** (0.029) 0.109*** (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.042*** (0.005) -0.013* (0.007)
Precipitation -0.063** (0.025) -0.047* (0.026)
Temperature 0.218*** (0.038) 0.217*** (0.038)
Date observed -0.049*** (0.019) -0.065*** (0.021)
Share desert 0.033 (0.022) 0.030 (0.020)
Dist. to coast 0.048** (0.023) 0.054** (0.024)
Elevation 0.013 (0.022) 0.014 (0.023)
Pct. malarial 0.386*** (0.030) 0.360*** (0.030)
Ruggedness 0.135*** (0.021) 0.121*** (0.022)
Absolute latitude 0.111*** (0.042) 0.136*** (0.043)
Major river 0.089** (0.042) 0.083* (0.042)
Mostly fishing 0.388*** (0.078) 0.416*** (0.081)
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Pop. den. at peak slavery 30.76 71.14
Table 2. Main results
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are probit, with marginal effects reported.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any slavery
(5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any land rights
Land mostly private (v1726 in SCCS) 0.301**
(0.144)
Land quality 0.050** 0.051**
(0.023) (0.022)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.123*** 0.183***
(0.015) (0.016)
Observations 80 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Any slavery
Large scale slaveholding (v919 in SCCS) 0.538***
(0.166)
Land quality 0.037* 0.014
(0.021) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.218*** 0.100***
(0.042) (0.029)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.027*** -0.011**
(0.007) (0.005)
Observations 166 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
Table 3: Alternative measures of the dependent variables
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Land is patrilineal Land inherited by sons
Slavery above incipient Hereditary slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land 
quality 
(v921)
Land 
quality 
(v924)
Land 
quality 
(v928)
Land 
scarcity 
(v1720)
Land quality 1.677*** 0.703*** 0.871***
(0.254) (0.112) (0.107)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.080***
(0.030)
Observations 172 172 172 79
R-squared 0.223 0.196 0.274
Other cont. N N N N
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln pop density 1995 0.098*** 0.123***
(0.010) (0.046)
     squared. -0.013**
(0.006)
ln(1 + pop. den.) - MJ Base 0.124*** 0.122***
(0.011) (0.040)
     squared. -0.012*
(0.007)
ln(1 + pop. den.) - ARVE Base 0.124*** 0.109***
(0.011) (0.038)
     squared. -0.013*
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, excepting columns 3, 4 and 5, with marginal effects reported. Columns 3, 4, and 5 are OLS.
Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Table 4: Alternative measures of land quality and population density
Spearman correlations
Historic 
pop 
density
Pop. den. 
1995
Historic 
pop den 
(MJ 
Base)
Historic 
pop den 
(ARVE 
Base)
Pop. 
density 
(v64)
Pop. 
density 
(v1130)
Historic pop density 1.00
Pop. den. 1995 0.89 1.00
Historic pop den (MJ Base) 0.92 0.88 1.00
Historic pop den (ARVE Base) 0.80 0.78 0.87 1.00
Pop. density (v64) 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.60 1.00
Pop. density (v1130) 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.61 0.91 1.00
Correlation coefficients
Historic pop density 1.00
Pop. den. 1995 0.59 1.00
Historic pop den (MJ Base) 0.68 0.86 1.00
Historic pop den (ARVE Base) 0.62 0.73 0.79 1.00
Pop. density (v64) 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.52 1.00
Pop. density (v1130) 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.90 1.00
Table 5: Correlations of population density measures
Notes: All values significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Land quality 0.059*** 0.086*** 0.032*** 0.036* 0.004
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.045*** 0.121*** 0.029***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 744 744 749 758 597 597 781 781 610 610
Dropped Lev LQ DfB LQ Lev PD DfB PD Americas Americas EuropeansEuropeans NonAg NonAg
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Land quality 0.039* 0.046** 0.010 0.055*** 0.044*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.124*** 0.178*** 0.106** 0.121*** 0.113**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.039) (0.044)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.012 -0.022*** -0.013* -0.013* -0.012*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 983 973 980 974 687 687 1,016 1,016 759 759
Dropped Lev LQ DfB LQ Lev PD DfB PD Amer. Amer. Euro. Euro. NonAg NonAg
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 6: Influential observations
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with
marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights
Any slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.084***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027)
Soil depth constraints 0.095*** 0.053**
(0.019) (0.021)
Soil fertility constraints 0.020 0.074***
(0.018) (0.026)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 7: Possible endogeneity of land quality
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects
reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clustering
Land quality Robust 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
Ethno. Region 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02
Country 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.08
UN Region 0.00 0.08 0.34 0.10
ln(1+pop. den.) Robust 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethno. Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
UN Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. Robust 0.00 0.05
Ethno. Region 0.00 0.05
Country 0.00 0.15
UN Region 0.00 0.09
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N Y N Y
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: All regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in
the table of main results.
Table 8: Alternative clusters (p. values)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land quality 0.079*** 0.045**
(0.017) (0.018)
Rainfall CV -0.311** 0.042 -0.120 0.009
(0.143) (0.113) (0.138) (0.138)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.162*** 0.124***
(0.010) (0.012)
Observations 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N N Y Y
Other crop Wheat Maize Cereals 
Roots/ 
tubers Pulses Oil crops Sugar Cotton 
Land quality 0.041* 0.036 0.048** 0.057*** 0.039* 0.071*** 0.049** 0.041*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Other crop suitability 0.012 0.036 -0.004 -0.045* 0.032 -0.074*** -0.033 0.042*
(0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.109***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.012* -0.012* -0.013* -0.012* -0.013* -0.014** -0.013* -0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Other crop suitability 0.008 0.036 0.004 -0.042 0.032 -0.059** -0.037 0.048*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Corr(Land  qual., suit.) 0.36 0.44 0.49 0.37 0.42 0.50 0.21 0.30
Any slavery
Table 9: Alternative theories
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.014 0.037
(0.018) (0.023)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.103*** 0.017
(0.013) (0.042)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.005
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 10: Results with region fixed effects
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects
reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial error model
Land quality 0.031** 0.017 0.006 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.047
(0.010) (0.011) (0.029) (0.030)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.018*** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wald test (λ=0) 726.5 387.7 580.6 233.9 1556 1567 668.0 689.6
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Spatial lag model
Land quality 0.029** 0.017 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.033
(0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.028)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.014*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
Wald test (ρ=0) 618.2 186.3 207.2 69.87 1517 1003 243.2 246.6
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 11: Galton's problem
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights Any slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land quality 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.157*** 0.180*** 0.266*** -0.042
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.046*** -0.002
(0.006) (0.007)
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 12: Other outcomes
Any state centralization Polygyny is usual
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are: Absolute latitude, major river, mostly
fishing, precipitation, temperature, date observed, dist. to coast, pct. malarial, elevation, ruggedness, share desert,
elevation.
Dep. variable
RHS variable
Omaha Prairie Pawnee Prairie
Cheremis Eastern Europe Fox Prairie
Guanche North Africa Miami Prairie
Yalunka Western Sudan Omaha Prairie
Mbuti African Hunters Matakam Nigerian Plateau
Ramcocame Eastern Brazil Makah Northwest Coast
Djuka Guiana Bachama Moslem Sudan
Walbiri Australia Macassare Western Indonesia
Fang Equatorial Bantu Gude Nigerian Plateau
Dep. variable
RHS variable
Yucatecma Central America Obostyak Arctic Asia Obostyak Arctic Asia
Bribri Central America Chahar Central Asia Bengali North and Central India
Guanche North Africa Menomini Prairie Uttarprad North and Central India
Keraki New Guinea Goldi Arctic Asia Goldi Arctic Asia
Banaro New Guinea Turkmen Central Asia Balinese Eastern Indonesia
Cheremis Eastern Europe Bengali North and Central India Santal North and Central India
Gidjingal Australia Hamyan North Africa Chahar Central Asia
Kaoka Western Melanesia Buryat Central Asia Kerala South India
Yanomamo Lower Amazon Mzab Sahara Menomini Prairie
Land quality Land quality
Table A1: Influential observations
Notes: For the regressions with the full set of controls in Table 2, these are the most influential observations in terms of dfbeta.
Land rights Slavery
Land rights Slavery Slavery
ln(1+pop. den.) ln(1+pop. den.) ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd.
Region
Any land 
rights Any slavery
Land quality 
(N (0,1))
Historic 
population 
density N
Africa 0.93 0.83 0.09 2.97 414
Circum-Mediterranean 0.92 0.70 0.00 3.21 157
East Eurasia 0.83 0.54 0.07 3.87 123
Insular Pacific 0.73 0.24 0.46 2.43 119
North America 0.29 0.27 -0.33 0.77 284
South America 0.27 0.27 -0.05 1.23 109
Table A2: Outcomes by Major Region
Notes: Each entry reports the fraction of societies in the region that possess land rights or slavery, or the average land
quality (normalized to be N(0,1)) or historic population density in the region. "N" refers to the sample for which historic
population density is not missing.
% of societies with: Mean of:
Land quality 0.044** (0.017) 0.049** (0.021)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.124*** (0.012) 0.087** (0.037)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.009 (0.006)
Precipitation -0.025 (0.020) -0.007 (0.021) -0.083*** (0.025) -0.072*** (0.025)
Temperature 0.045** (0.022) 0.005 (0.020) 0.139*** (0.027) 0.125*** (0.028)
Date observed 0.051*** (0.019) 0.004 (0.016) -0.051*** (0.019) -0.067*** (0.022)
Share desert 0.008 (0.017) 0.036** (0.016) 0.036 (0.022) 0.031 (0.020)
Dist. to coast -0.011 (0.018) 0.016 (0.018) 0.038* (0.023) 0.041* (0.024)
Elevation -0.005 (0.019) 0.005 (0.018) 0.010 (0.022) 0.011 (0.023)
Pct. malarial 0.196*** (0.025) 0.142*** (0.024) 0.362*** (0.027) 0.334*** (0.027)
Ruggedness 0.070*** (0.016) 0.036** (0.016) 0.129*** (0.021) 0.115*** (0.022)
Major river -0.043 (0.034) -0.088** (0.034) 0.101** (0.042) 0.097** (0.043)
Mostly fishing -0.176** (0.071) -0.014 (0.067) 0.437*** (0.077) 0.469*** (0.081)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Pop. den. at peak slavery 116.1
(3) (4)
Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
probit, with marginal effects reported.
Table A3. Main results without absolute latitude
(1) (2)
Any land rights
